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Abstract 
 
The Animadversiones in Elementorum Philosophiae by a little known Flemish scholar G. Moranus, published in 
Brussels in 1655 was an early European response to Hobbes‟s De corpore. Although it is has been referred to by 
various Hobbes scholars, such as Noel Malcolm, Doug Jesseph, and Alexander Bird it has been little studied. 
Previous scholarship has tended to focus on the mathematical criticisms of Andre Tacquet which Moranus 
included in the form of a letter in his volume. Moranus‟s philosophical objections to Hobbes‟s natural 
philosophy offer a fascinating picture of the critical reception of Hobbes‟s work by a religious writer trained in 
the late scholastic tradition.  Moranus‟s opening criticism clearly shows that he is unhappy with Hobbes‟s 
exclusion of the divine and the immaterial from natural philosophy. He asks what authority Hobbes has for 
breaking with the common understanding of philosophy, as defined by Cicero „the knowledge of things human 
and divine‟. He also offers natural philosophical and theological criticisms of Hobbes for overlooking the 
generation of things involved in the Creation. He also attacks the natural philosophical underpinning of 
Hobbes‟s civil philosophy. In this paper I look at a number of philosophical topics which Moranus criticised in 
Hobbes‟s work, including his mechanical psychology, his theory of imaginary space, his use of the concept of 
accidents, his blurring of the distinction between the human being and the animal, and his theories of motion. 
Moranus‟s criticisms, which are a mixture of philosophical and theological objections, gives us some clear 
indications of what made Hobbes‟ natural philosophy controversial amongst his contemporaries, and sheds new 
light on the early continental reception of Hobbes‟s work.       
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On 21 September 1655, just three short months after the first publication of the Latin version 
of Thomas Hobbes‟s De corpore, a critique of Hobbes‟s work was published in Brussels by 
an almost unknown Flemish scholar by the name of Moranus.
1
 The Animadversiones in 
Elementorum Philosophiae sectionem [primum] De Corpore. Editam A Thoma Hobbes Anglo 
Malmesburiensi, is a slim volume of 51 pages, much of which is taken up by the detailed 
mathematical criticisms of Moranus‟s friend, the Antwerp mathematician and Jesuit priest 
André Tacquet (1612-1660).
2
 Despite the fact that The Animadversiones is one of the first 
European responses to Hobbes‟s natural philosophy, it has received surprisingly little 
attention. 
 In his essay on „Hobbes and the European Republic of Letters‟, in Aspects of Hobbes 
(2002) Noel Malcolm observed that:   
 
Hobbes‟s botched mathematical demonstrations helped to deflate his reputation among 
continental scientists. The critical book published by Moranus in Brussels before the end 
of 1655, which included disproofs of Hobbes‟s mathematics by André Tacquet, may 
have had some effect, as did the circulation of John Wallis‟s Elenchus geometriae 
hobbianae.
3
 
 
In an earlier chapter, Malcolm mentions Moranus‟s work as one of a number of anti-
Hobbesian works owned by the merchant, printer and poet Pierre de Cardonnel (1614-1667).
4
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There are also a number of fleeting references to Moranus‟s work in the works of scholars 
interested in Hobbes‟s mathematics. In a 1979 article on Hobbes and mathematical method, 
Wolfgang Breidert mentions Tacquet‟s mathematical criticisms of Hobbes, when discussing 
Hobbes‟s belief that a collective campaign was being mounted against him.5 Breidert points 
out that Seth Ward was already aware of  Moranus‟s book in 1656 when he published his In 
Thomae Hobbii Philosophiam Exercitatio Epistolica, where he refers to Tacquet‟s „letter to 
Moranus‟ (Epistola ad Moranum) alongside the polemical works of John Wallis as a reason 
for concentrating his efforts on the physical aspects of Hobbes‟s De corpore.6 Tacquet‟s 
critique of Hobbes‟s mathematics is included in Moranus‟s book in the form of a letter 
addressed to Moranus.
7
 Ward does, as we shall see, make occasional references to Moranus‟s 
philosophical objections to Hobbes‟s work, although these references have not hitherto been 
noticed. 
 Since Breidert‟s article a number of historians of mathematics have mentioned the 
Animadversiones. Alexander Bird‟s 1996 essay, „Squaring the Circle: Hobbes on Philosophy 
and Geometry‟ briefly mentions Moranus, but provides no further details.8  In a footnote in 
the introduction to his 1999 edition of Hobbes‟s De corpore, Karl Schuhmann also briefly 
mentions Moranus‟s work, but only to register that Hobbes had not bothered to revise his 
work in light of Moranus‟s and Tacquet‟s criticisms.9 Douglas Jesseph refers fleetingly to 
Moranus‟s work in his study of the Hobbes-Wallis controversy, Squaring the Circle (2000), 
mentioning simply that „the mathematical sections of Moranus‟s critique were written by 
André Tacquet.‟10 
 Regardless of whether Hobbes responded to the criticisms of Moranus and Tacquet, they 
do have some inherent historical significance. Whilst the polemics against Hobbes in his 
native country have received significant attention, Moranus‟s philosophical objections to 
Hobbes‟s natural philosophy offer us a fascinating picture of the early critical reception of 
Hobbes‟s work by a continental religious writer trained in the late scholastic tradition, and 
may (as Malcolm suggested) have had an effect on Hobbes‟s European reputation.  
 In this paper I will look at a number of philosophical topics which Moranus criticised in 
Hobbes‟s work, including, the relationship between philosophy and theology, his mechanical 
psychology, his theory of imaginary space, his use of the concept of accidents, his blurring of 
the distinction between the human being and the animal, and his theories of motion. 
 Firstly, however, I would like to speculate a little on why Moranus found himself writing 
this book in the first place. As we know, the imminent publication of Hobbes‟s De corpore 
created a great stir among the scholars of Oxford at the time, and the Professor of 
Mathematics John Wallis launched a virulent and protracted campaign against Hobbes‟s 
work which was aided and abetted by the printer who seems to have allowed pre-publication 
drafts to circulate amongst interested parties.
11
 Wallis and his friends were busy formulating a 
counter-offensive against Hobbes‟s work, and it seems that Moranus was in Oxford at this 
time. According to his prefatory epistle addressed to Hobbes (dated 21 September 1655) 
Moranus said that he only recently returned to Belgium from Oxford (Non ita pridem est 
quod in Angliam è Belgio veni), where he had gone in order to converse with „erudite men in 
Theology, Ethics, Physics, and Geometry‟.12 In particular he had been discussing the 
circulation of the blood, and the role of the vis formatrix in the formation of the foetus with 
William Harvey,
13
 and Harvey had mentioned Hobbes to his Belgian visitor as „an author of a 
new work of Physics, De Corpore, and a new work of Ethics, De Ciue.‟14 Moranus sought 
out Hobbes‟s works, and an unnamed friend obtained a copy of De corpore for him, although 
the same friend (who seems to have been a printer – typographus), refused to provide him 
with a copy of De Ciue.
15
 We could accept Moranus‟s story about encountering Hobbes‟s 
work via an informal recommendation of William Harvey, but it seems possible, however, 
that Moranus had been moving in Oxford circles where the imminent publication of Hobbes‟s 
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work was being discussed, and had been recruited by the anti-Hobbes lobby, or at least 
volunteered his services to them. Tacquet‟s involvement seems to have been Moranus‟s 
doing, as Tacquet mentions that Moranus had sent him a copy of Hobbes‟s work, asking his 
opinion on the mathematical chapters.
16
 Moranus must have sent Tacquet a copy of De 
corpore very quickly for his friend to read, digest and write his critical letter to Moranus 
within three months of its publication. It seems possible that – like Wallis and his friends – 
Moranus might have procured pre-publication copies of Hobbes‟s work from the printer, and 
had been encouraged to pass them on to his famous mathematical friend. This would explain 
why Ward was aware, within months of its publication, of a small book published in Brussels 
by an obscure Belgian philosopher.  
 
 
1. Philosophy and religion 
 
Moranus is a deeply obscure figure. He was a friend of a Jesuit priest, but does not appear to 
have been a Jesuit himself.
17
 His philosophical vocabulary suggests someone who had read 
Jesuit commentaries on Aristotle, and who was familiar with late scholastic natural 
philosophy and psychology. He also seems to have certain religious commitments. He was 
that is to say, a Belgian Catholic, who appears to have had a university education, possibly at 
a Jesuit College.
18
 Given his particular discussions with Harvey while he was in Oxford it is 
possible that he had some medical training. He was clearly not put off by the innovative 
nature of Harvey‟s doctrines, and apparently he was initially attracted to Hobbes‟s work 
because of its promise to simplify and clarify philosophical language. Moranus read 
Hobbes‟s dedicatory epistle eagerly and with pleasure because it promised to „banish from 
philosophy words and alien concepts introduced by those who are excessively metaphysical, 
that is to say, when they lack substance and injure the truth.‟ This, Moranus says, accorded 
well with his own disposition.
19
 However, he is soon disturbed by Hobbes‟s dismissal of 
contemporary scholasticism and the fathers of the Church who had introduced „many false 
and absurd doctrines out of the metaphysics and physics of Aristotle‟ which – Hobbes 
claimed – had been noxious to Christianity, and his championing of modern natural 
philosophers such as Galileo, Harvey, Gassendi and Mersenne (the last of which, Moranus 
says, is „not a very solid author‟ – auctor minime solidus).20 
 Most importantly, perhaps, Moranus – like many of his contemporaries – was 
uncomfortable with Hobbes‟s separation of theology and natural philosophy. The opening 
paragraph of the work, which addresses  De Corpore I.8. clearly shows that he is unhappy 
with Hobbes‟s exclusion of the divine and the incorporeal from natural philosophy: 
 
The Subject of Philosophy, you assert, is every Body of which we can conceive any 
generation, and which we may by any consideration thereof compare with other Bodies. 
and hence you exclude from Philosophy first of all God, then the Angels and all those 
things which are thought to be neither bodies, nor affections of Bodies.
21
 
 
He demands to know what authority he has for breaking with the common understanding of 
philosophy as „the knowledge of things human and divine,‟22 and criticises him for 
overlooking the generation of things involved in the Creation:  
 
Do you conceive there to be no generation in God nor any generation of the eternal 
word? No creation of things produced by it? No agreement necessarily dependent on it? 
No connection established between them so that the first mover and that which remains 
unmoved give motion to all things? so that they might exist here and now? 
23
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Moranus also objects to Hobbes‟s anthropology. If he restricts philosophy to bodies, how can 
he do full justice to the human being? 
 
What are you dealing with in the second section of your philosophy which promises to 
treat of man? Is it only that which is body or corporeal? But this is not man but an 
animal. Does it not consider the soul, that is the mind, incorporeal and immortal on 
account of its true likeness and emulation of its author?  But this does not belong to your 
philosophy?
24
    
 
In others passage we can see that Hobbes wasn‟t always fully aware of (or chose to ignore) 
the interdependence of theology and natural philosophy in Catholic Europe. For example, 
Moranus criticises Hobbes for maintaining what one would imagine would be an 
uncontroversial doctrine, i.e., that „neither can two bodies be in the same place at the same 
time: nor can one body be in two places at the same time.‟25 Moranus‟s initial objection does 
not, on the face of it, seem particularly compelling: „two bodies penetrating each other, he 
says, are in the same place, and one body reproduced or replicated can be in two places.‟26 
The first of the two objections seems reasonable up to a point, although interpenetrating 
bodies would occupy proximate but not identical places, but the second objection sounds less 
obvious. What kind of reproduction or replication does Moranus have in mind? First of all he 
refers to the rarity and density of bodies, saying that God can will bodies to interpenetrate in 
this way:  
 
two bodies may penetrate each other and in fact do penetrate each other by the power of 
the first agent or entity, that is God, from the first creation of bodies, the greater density 
or rarity of which is not, or cannot be, anything other than the intraposition of more or 
less homogenous matter.
27
   
 
By the end of the paragraph we can see the underlying motivation for this discussion of the 
interpenetrability of bodies: the doctrine of the resurrected body. „The reproduction and 
interpenetration of the same body,‟ Moranus says, 
 
will be denied by nobody who does not wish or dare, against reason and faith, to deny 
the infinite active force of the first being and the resurrection of the same and real body 
that I demonstrate elsewhere; neither of which I trust you wish or dare to do.
28
 
 
It seems unlikely to me that Hobbes had foreseen this kind of theological objection to what 
seems like a natural philosophical truism, or been sensitive to the theological stakes of his 
matter theory.  
 
 
 
2. Imaginary space 
 
Not all of Moranus‟s criticisms are religiously motivated, however (or at least not in any 
direct way), and some of his objections involve what he considers to be Hobbes‟s technical 
mishandling of philosophical concepts. One area of Hobbes‟ philosophy which has attracted 
significant attention from Hobbes scholars is his doctrine of „imaginary space‟ (spatium 
imaginarium). Moranus‟s Animadversiones sheds some interesting light on the topic although 
up to now the secondary literature on Hobbes‟s concept of space has neglected Moranus‟ 
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work. The terms in which Moranus engages with the Hobbesian concept of space, could help 
us, for example, to consider the merits of the disagreement between Karl Schuhmann and 
Cees Leijenhorst, who have argued that Hobbes‟ concept of imaginary space should be 
viewed in the context of Jesuit commentaries on Aristotle,
29
 and Martine Pécharman who has 
argued that „the search for Jesuit sources for the concept of space in Hobbes does not render 
sufficient justice to the progress of reflection internal to the philosophy of Hobbes.‟30   
 It would appear from Moranus‟s objections to Hobbes‟ theory of space that he saw it as 
part of the ongoing scholastic debate about the nature of space and place. First of all Moranus 
attacks Hobbes‟s definition of space in De corpore VII.3 where he says that „space is the 
Phantasm of an existing thing in so far as it exists.‟31 His first point of attack is Hobbes‟s 
inconsistency, because he notes that in the previous section he had talked about an empty 
space or vacuum being, „fitter to receive new bodies‟ than a full space.32 This phrase 
assumes, as Moranus points out, that „space is not, therefore, the phantasm of an existing 
thing in so far as it exists, but rather the Phantasm of a non-existing thing in so far as it does 
not exist.‟33 That is to say, a vacuum is an imaginary space ready to receive really existent 
things. Furthermore, when he states that space is a phantasm, he is making a claim about its 
ontological status: „when something exists in a fantastic form [Phantasticè],‟ Moranus says, 
„it cannot be posited, or said to be posited, as anything other than fantastic. And therefore the 
empty phantasm of space serves no other purpose than to confuse real truth with vacuous 
imaginations.‟34 Moranus here seems to be defending the problematic idea of space as an ens 
reale rather than an ens imaginarium  or ens rationis (he doesn‟t want to „confuse real truth 
with vacuous imaginations‟). 
 Cees Leijenhorst, in his 1996 article on „Jesuit concepts of Spatium Imaginarium‟, shows 
how the Jesuit textbooks „display a distinct tendency to use the concept of imaginary space in 
order to solve the problems linked with the Aristotelian notion of place,‟35 and insists that 
Hobbes „takes up the notion of spatium imaginarium developed in Jesuit commentaries,‟ 
rather than adopting the notion of space advanced by novatores such as Telesio, Patrizi and 
Gassendi, who saw space as „incorporeal but self-subsistent (i.e., substance-like).‟36 For his 
part, Moranus adopts one of the Jesuit solutions outlined in Leijenhorst‟s study, that of the 
Spanish Jesuit Franciscus Toletus (1532-1596).
37
 In his Commentaria vna cum Quaestionibus 
in Octo Libros Aristotelis De Physica Ausculatione (1573), Toletus distinguished between 
what he called „intrinsic‟ and „extrinsic‟ space or place. 
„True place is twofold‟, says Toletus, 
 
one kind of place is intrinisc to the thing itself, and the other extrinsic. Extrinisic place 
is that which surrounds the located body itself, that is to say, the containing body or 
its outermost surface, of which Aristotle spoke. The intrinsic place of a thing, 
however, is that space itself which the thing itself truly occupies, according to its 
bodily nature.
38
 
 
While Toletus does not believe that place is a substance – either corporeal or incorporeal39 – 
he does not believe that it is merely imaginary – or rather, he distinguishes between real and 
imaginary place. One kind of place is real he says, the other imaginary, the space beyond the 
heavens which we can imagine to exist is imaginary. The vacuum, he says, if it were to exist 
in this world, would be an imaginary space.
40
  
 Moranus ignores Toletus‟s remarks on imaginary space, but adopts the intrinsic/extrinsic 
distinction, and puts forward Toletus‟s understanding of real place and space as the truly 
authoritative position. „The real truth of places or spaces,‟ he says  
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is grasped by one who says that the intrinsic place of the thing or the only real space is 
that extended thing which is nowhere else other than in itself: thus the true place of 
the world is the world itself, which is nowhere else other than in itself, since there is 
nothing outside it : but the extrinisic place of the located thing is the surface of the 
body surrounding that located thing; but not the outermost intrinisic surface of the 
thing itself located as you seem to assume towards the end of chapter VIII section 5.
41
  
 
Moranus here contests Hobbes‟s understanding of the intrinsic space of located bodies, but he 
certainly seems to think that Hobbes is operating within the terms of late-scholastic 
commentary, and this belief gives some credence to Leijenhorst‟s claims, although (as 
Leijenhorst himself is quick to point out), Hobbes‟s use of the concept of spatium 
imaginarium has a very different motivation from that of the Jesuits, who were trying to 
preserve the authority of Aristotle‟s concept of place, whilst providing solutions to some 
traditional problems relating to it.
42
 
 
 
3. Philosophus or Philophantasus? Hobbes on accidents 
 
In his In Thomae Hobbii Philosophiam, Seth Ward, in one of his very occasional references 
to Moranus‟s Animadversiones says that he will refrain from discussing Hobbes‟s claim in 
De corpore VIII.23 that what gives man his essence is an accident, because „Moranus has 
confuted it, and therefore I will pass over it in silence.‟43 Ward, then, was willing to defer to 
his Flemish counterpart on this issue, and Moranus does a creditable job of showing that 
Hobbes had fundamentally misunderstood the nature of accident as it was defined by 
Aristotelian natural philosophers.
44
 Moranus declares himself to be baffled by Hobbes‟ 
definition of an accident in VIII.2 as „the faculty of  a body by which it impresses its concept 
in us.‟(accidens esse facultatem corporis qua sui conceptum nobis imprimit). An accident, he 
retorts, is not an accident because it impresses a concept in us, but because it is the accident 
of a body.
45
 Hobbes‟s definition is obscure he says, and „alien from the truth‟ as  „many 
things in bodies imprint their concepts in us which are not accidents‟.46 Hobbes, he says, 
improperly confines accidents to „modes alone‟, which has been „eloquently denied by many 
philosophers who are not lovers of vain names or concepts to be something distinct from 
things and circumstances‟, the real accidents of bodies, they say, are very different – an 
accident being the thing which arranges bodies into different substantial forms. Accidents, 
Moranus says, do not exist in order to impress concepts but „in order that the bodies 
themselves may be altered in various ways.‟ 47 
 Hobbes also makes a fundamental error – from the perspective of a late scholastic like 
Moranus, when he confuses accident and essence. The error seems all the more egregious 
because it is not just any essence that Hobbes confuses, but the essence of man itself. In De 
corpore VIII.23, Hobbes says that „It is customary to call the accident on account of which 
we impose a certain name on something – such as the rationality of man – its “essence”.‟ 
Moranus is incredulous at this fundamental mistake: 
 
Essence you say? Since it is not customary for others to speak of it in this way, why will I 
be pleased to have it so? Since, in your judgement in III.4 that “these words, essence, 
entity and all these other barbarisms are not necessary to philosophy”, it seems to you that 
rationality is an accident of man? I believe it to be the essential constitutive difference of 
man.
48
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Moranus is also unhappy when Hobbes differentiates bodies from accidents on the basis of 
their generation. When Hobbes in VIII.20 says that „bodies are things and are not generated, 
accidents are generated and are not things.‟49 Moranus retorts :  
 
You might have said not absolute or substantial things but the thing of a thing or the being 
of a being, but you have said simply, “not things”? This may show someone to be a Philo-
fantasist but not a Philosopher.
50
  
 
Hobbes probably did not intend to deny accidents any kind of real existence in this passage, 
but Moranus is able to undermine him by pointing out the lack of the kinds of subtle 
distinctions which an Aristotelian would make when discussing the rather obscure 
relationship between a body and its accidents. For Moranus, a philosopher who neglected the 
customary metaphysical distinctions was simply living in a kind of fantasy world.   
 A similar incomprehension can be found when Moranus reads Hobbes‟s attack on the idea 
of the „inherence‟ of accidents in bodies. For Hobbes, the accidents of colour, odour and heat 
are in bodies in a straightforward way (inesse), just like extension, motion, rest or figure. 
Those who believe in inherence, he says, should suspend their judgement, and might come to 
see that these accidents are „certain motions, either of the mind of the one who imagines, or 
of the bodies themselves.‟51 Moranus concedes that colour, heat, odour „in as much as they 
are sensible, ought necessarily to exist in motion, so that they may be sensed by the 
imagination‟, but refuses to suspend his judgement about them. Ironically he criticises 
Hobbes, in part, for using the standard scholastic terminology about accidents: „qualities or 
sensible accidents‟, he says, „or those things you call beings of a being, or tenuous beings or 
corpuscles or whatever other abstraction you imagine do not exist in motion, but only sensate 
accidents of them exist.‟52  Moranus‟ criticisms seems slightly confused: he criticises Hobbes 
for calling sensible accidents entis entia, which he implies is an „abstract term‟, but this is the 
very terminology used by Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on Aristotle‟s Metaphysics,53 
and is also used by later scholastics.
54
 But Moranus then equates this abstract term with 
others, like „tenuous beings‟ (a term used by Bernardino Telesio and Tommaso Campanella 
in relation to the phenomenon of heat),
55
 and „corpuscles‟. The criticism of the term 
corpuscles is particularly strange, as Moranus uses this term himself later in the same 
passage. Sensible accidents, Moranus says, perfect and dispose the bodies they are in „by 
what I call the perpetual agitation of their corpuscles which is made by the various motions of 
bodies in the universe.‟56 
 Moranus is among those seventeenth-century philosophers – such as Daniel Sennert – who 
sought a compromise between corpuscularism and Aristotelian natural philosophy.
57
 He 
draws, for example,  on the Aristotelian notion of minima naturalia, a term he uses as a 
synonym for atoms.
58
 For Moranus, minima are the naturally continuous parts of bodies, 
which have been placed in prime matter by God, and he pointedly distinguishes his 
corpuscles from those of Democritus‟ atomism.59 Moranus‟s corpsuscular matter theory 
allows him to criticise Hobbes on his own terrain when he attacks the experiments to 
disprove the existence of a vacuum in De corpore, XXVI.2 as  „trite‟ and „insignificant‟.60 
Although Moranus is not an atomist he does insist that all fluid mixtures consist of „many 
hard and flexible corpuscles of various shapes and magnitudes,‟61 and he seeks to overturn 
Hobbes‟s arguments on corpuscular grounds, claiming that he has misundertstood the nature 
of continuous homogeneous bodies, like air and water.    
 
 While Moranus shows himself willing to contest Hobbes‟s experiments by refuting them 
on a technical level – invoking alternative explanations based on a corpuscular but non-
atomistic matter theory, there is a much more serious objection underlying his critique: 
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Hobbes‟s rejection of immaterial motive force, and by implication, God as the unmoved first 
mover:  
  
You deny the existence of an immaterial motive force of the body because, you say, that 
nothing is moved unless by a moving and contiguous body. You deny it badly and you 
prove it worse; for either you bring forward for a reason the very thing that you deny, 
which is absurd; or you deny that an unmoved first mover and self-moving intelligence 
can cause the motion of a body, which is manifestly false from what I have said above, 
and by the authority of Aristotle and by reason.
62
 
 
At bottom, then, Moranus rejects Hobbes‟s natural philosophy as both un-Aristotelian and 
impious. 
 
4. Mechanical psychology 
 
Moranus also argues quite strenuously against Hobbes‟s mechanical account of perception 
and cognition, particularly because it does not distinguish clearly enough between man and 
the animal. Moranus, however, addresses himself to the philosophical coherence of Hobbes‟s 
theory, and teases out what he sees as obscurities or self-contradictions. For example, in 
commenting on De corpore XXV.2, where Hobbes is explaining sense perception as the 
result of a resisting endeavour of the sense organ against the incoming endeavour of the 
object, Moranus objects to Hobbes‟s reasoning by invoking scholastic conceptions of 
generation and natural motion:   
 
anyone who is not completely ignorant easily grasps that no sense perception is made 
without the motion or alteration of the sentient [but] from this alone you consider 
yourself to have enough so that you may resolutely define [...] that sensation is made by 
the endeavour (or motion) from the sensory organs towards the outside, which is 
generated by the object inwards and to a certain extent remaining in it. by the reaction 
the phantasm is made. I, however, detect not only obscurity in this definition, but also 
falsity. For firstly, in paragraph 2  you state that there is an endeavour or motion from the 
organ contrary to the endeavour or motion from the object; therefore the endeavour of 
the sensory organs towards the outside are not generated by an endeavour from the object 
towards the inside: for contraries are not generated by contraries but destroyed; then how 
can you speak of the natural internal motion of the organ, if it is generated by a motion 
or endeavour from the object, which is opposed to nature, or violent?
63
 
 
In addition to questioning the „naturalness‟ of mechanical motion, Moranus also questions the 
nature of the phantasm and the nature and location of its generation. What is this „chimerical 
idol‟, ask Moranus, which seems to be produced out of nothing in multitudes? Is this 
mysterious generation of images from the objects and the organ, like the generation of a 
foetus from a seed? Where does this generation take place, he asks. Is the place of reaction 
some mid-point between the object and the sensory organs? Or is the place of reaction the 
object itself, as the source of the endeavours which enter the sensory organs?
64
 Moranus is 
actually quite astute, as Hobbes does not make it sufficiently clear how phantasms can be 
generated by two opposing motions, or why phantasms are produced instead of something 
else.
65
 
 There are other, much more troubling consequences which arise from this, however. 
Moranus criticises Hobbes for suggesting that phantasms are produced by motion alone. It 
would be more accurate, he says if Hobbes had discussed them as a special kind of motion.
66
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Hobbes does specify that sense is only produced in „some of the internal parts of the sentient‟ 
(partium aliquarum intùs sentiente) – namely the parts which we call the „organs of sense‟67 
– but Moranus presses the idea that perception is motion in genere to draw a disturbing 
consequence.   „Supposing that motion of the organ and the phantasm moved by it to exist,‟ 
he says, 
 
that is, speaking like you not fantastically, but physically, why is the configuration or 
impression of the organ by the motion of the object and the figure answering to it sense 
perception or sensation? Certainly if sense perception is nothing but motion and the 
configuration of the organ made by that motion, all bodies, which are configured by the 
motion of reaction  one way or another, and really receive a likeness or phantasm, ought 
to sense, and therefore wax pressed and imprinted by a seal ought to see.
68
 
 
If perception is just matter in motion, then any matter which can be moved must be capable 
of perception. In a curious way, then, Hobbes‟ mechanism implicates him in a kind of vitalist 
belief in sentient matter. In fact, Hobbes is aware of this consequence himself, and seems 
strangely unconcerned about it. In XXV.5 he says: 
 
But though all Sense, as I have said, be made by Reaction, nevertheless it is not 
necessary that every thing that Reacteth should have Sense.  I know there have been 
Philosophers, & those learned men, who have maintained that all Bodies are endued with 
Sense.  Nor do I see how they can be refuted, if the nature of Sense be placed in Reaction 
onely.  And, though by the Reaction of Bodies inanimate  a Phantasme might be made, it 
would nevertheless cease, as soon as ever the Object were removed.  For unless those 
Bodies had Organs, (as living Creatures have) fit for the retaining of such Motion as is 
made in them , their Sense would be such, as that they should never remember the same .  
And therefore this hath nothing to do with that Sense which is the subject of my 
discourse.
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Hobbes was probably thinking of Telesio and Campanella when he speaks of philosophers 
who have argued that matter is sentient, and he freely admits that the suppositions of his own 
theory would allow him no grounds to refute such a position, although he does not adopt it 
himself. His only objection is the lack of the requisite organs – although he does not say what 
makes the matter of organs „fit‟ for retaining phantasms as distinct from other kinds of 
matter. 
 Moranus pushes the absurdity of Hobbes‟s position. He anticipates that Hobbes might 
make some objections about the nature of the motions involved in perception:  
 
You might say, it is an endeavour, not just a motion. But what is this endeavour but a 
passive motion from another moved body, which there is in the wax? You might say that 
this endeavour is a motion of the corporeal soul or life coexisting or united with the 
organ; but what is this soul or life other than a body, just like that last organ itself and the 
wax which are posited above?
70
  
 
I‟m not sure that Hobbes would agree with Moranus‟s definition of conatus as a „passive 
motion‟, and he certainly did not claim that conatus was a kind of „soul or life‟. Moranus is 
right to surmise that for Hobbes the human soul is a material thing, and he uses this to posit 
logical absurdities which follow from it. „Thus it remains,‟ he says, 
 
10 
 
 that there is sense even in imprinted wax; because, as you say, not only philosophers and 
learned men sense but also trees, by that it is posited both that a tree is an animal, and 
that every animal is a tree; or there is nothing vital or corporeal in the soul, if sense 
perception is nothing other than motion or the configuration of a body.
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If we accept Hobbes‟s arguments, then sealing wax senses that it is being stamped and trees 
are animals. 
 When he reaches XXV.8, Moranus turns once again to religious objections. Here Hobbes 
explicitly states that the generation of phantasms which result in perception and thinking are 
common to both man and the animals.  
 
Now you begin to reveal yourself and demonstrate as a truth what I was afraid of before, 
The perpetuall arising of Phantasmes, both in Sense and Imagination, is that which we 
commonly call Discourse of the Mind, and is common to men with other living 
Creatures. Is it not this that you say you have done in section 3 of De Cive, by strong 
Arguments of Reason, without repugnance to Gods Word?
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 Surely this does not trouble 
you, who in this [passage] so manifestly contradict the divine word, completely 
repugning more than one passage [in the Bible].
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Moranus cites passages from Ecclesiastes (15:14) and Genesis (1:26), which indicate that 
God created man in his likeness, and with reason and free will.
74
 Hobbes‟s psychology 
flagrantly contradicts this Biblical conception of man as a special creation. „Where did you 
read anything like this in the divine word concerning the animal?‟ Moranus demands, 
 
and why I ask you, do you distinguish between „animals‟ and „men‟? Or why might I, at 
this very moment, call you a „man‟? If discourse of the mind by which power we are 
men, is nothing besides sensation and the senses, that is the production of phantasms, and 
if it is common to you and the animal? I call „men‟ those who think insensible truths, so 
that in thinking I know myself to be a man; this discourse of the mind is not the 
production of phantasms, but from the principles of divine truth, that is, by the light of 
the divine face imprinted on us by rational motion; elsewhere I demonstrate that it is only 
in men; I say very little to you using your own principles.
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Conclusions 
 
What became of Moranus‟s Animadversiones? They were not – as we have seen – entirely 
ignored by Hobbes‟s contemporaries. Seth Ward was well aware of  Moranus‟s work, and 
even defers to it on occasions. When discussing Moranus‟s criticisms of Hobbes‟s views on 
necessity in De corpore XXV, Ward – a little hyperbolically perhaps – referred to him as „the 
famous Moranus‟ (Clarissimus Moranus). Moranus he said had revealed all kinds of 
problems in Hobbes‟s position, but Ward declines to discuss the issue of human freedom and 
refers his readers instead to Moranus and the arguments of John Bramhall.
76
 
 John Wallis also mentions Moranus in 1656, albeit indirectly. In his Due Correction for 
Mr Hobbes or Schoole Discipline, for not saying his Lessons right (1656), Wallis mentions a 
„fling at Moranus‟, in Hobbes‟s Six Lessons to the Professors of the Mathematiques (1656).77 
In the Six Lessons Hobbes does indeed mention – but does not engage with – Moranus‟s   
Animadversiones. It is clear that Hobbes had read the dedicatory epistle which had been 
addressed to him, as he paraphrases some of Moranus‟s remarks about his reasons for visiting 
Oxford.
78
 He dismisses Moranus‟s „common and childish learning‟ and criticises him for 
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having wasted the time he had spent with William Harvey. Rather than learning from Harvey, 
Hobbes says, he spent his time „venting his own childish Opinions, not suffering the Doctor 
scarce to speak.‟79 Not finding himself „much admired‟, Hobbes claims, Moranus:  
 
took occasion ... to be revenged of D. Harvey, by sleighting his learning publiquely; 
and tels me that his learning was onely Experiments, which he sayes I say have no 
more certainty then Civil Histories. Which is false. My words are, Ante hos nihil certi 
in Physicâ erat praeter Experimenta cuique sua, & Historias Naturales, si tamen & 
hae dicendae certae sint, quae Civilibus Historiis certiores non sunt. 
 
Hobbes was clearly rankled by Moranus‟s jibe in the prefatory epistle where he suggests that 
Hobbes‟ praise of Harvey in the dedicatory epistle of the De corpore was self-serving, and 
disparages Hobbes by disparaging Harvey‟s achievements. Hobbes had said that Harvey had 
been the first to discover „the Science of Mans Body, the most profitable part of Natural 
Science.‟80 Before Harvey‟s works, Hobbes said, „there was nothing certain in Natural 
Philosophy but every mans Experiments to himself, and the Natural Histories, if they may be 
called certain, that are no certainer then Civil Histories.‟81 Moranus exploits the ambiguity of 
Hobbes‟s syntax to suggest that it was experiments, rather than natural histories that were „no 
certainer then Civil Histories‟. Harvey, Moranus says, „confessed to me that his doctrine of 
the circulation of the blood relied on experiments alone, which you say are no more certain 
than civil histories, but at my lodgings, and in the presence of an intelligent witness, he did 
not defend it in a satisfactory way.‟82 Hobbes makes no further reference to Moranus, whom 
he obviously considered to be unworthy of a detailed rebuttal. 
 Although Hobbes didn‟t feel that Moranus was worthy of a reply, Robert Boyle begged to 
differ. Almost thirty years after the publication of Moranus‟s Animadversiones, Boyle writes:  
 
whilst such Mathematicians as Dr Wallis, Dr Ward, Tacquet, and Moranus (Men much too 
famous to be despicable Adversaries) having a good while since professedly and 
unchalleng‟d written against him, he hath yet, the whole Discourses of some, and so great 
a part of the Objections of the others, to reply to.
83
 
 
While referring to Moranus as a mathematician, let alone a famous one, would suggest that 
Boyle had no firsthand experience of the Animadversiones, he is perhaps not wrong in 
suggesting that Moranus – like Ward – was worthy of a response. As far as I am aware 
Boyle‟s reference is the last trace of Moranus‟s critique of Hobbes until Breidert unearthed it 
from Ward‟s polemic in 1979.  
 I hope that this brief survey of Moranus‟ little book has shown that renewed attention to 
Moranus and Tacquet‟s criticisms of Hobbes might have something to offer to scholars 
interested in Hobbes‟s natural philosophy and mathematics. Just as Wallis and Ward attacked 
Hobbes on two fronts, with Wallis focusing on mathematics and Ward focusing on the 
physics, ethics and politics, so Moranus and Tacquet present a two-pronged attack against 
Hobbes‟s De corpore.84 While Tacquet‟s mathematical objections have received some 
attention (although there has been no detailed analysis of his refutations), Moranus‟s 
philosophical objections seem to have been completely ignored, even by those interested in 
the controversy surrounding the publication of Hobbes‟s De corpore.85 While we know much 
about the English reception of his work, Moranus offers us a tantalising glimpse of how a 
European scholar with religious investments and connections to the anti-Hobbes lobby in 
Oxford reacted to the impieties of Hobbes‟s materialist philosophy.   
 
 
12 
 
 
NOTES 
                                                          
1
 G. Moranus, Animadversiones in Elementorum Philosophiae sectionem I. De Corpore. Editam A Thoma 
Hobbes Anglo Malmesburiensi. Londini 1655. (Brussels, 1655). Moranus‟s dedicatory epistle is dated „X. Cal. 
Octobris. M.DC.LV.‟  i.e., 21 September 1655 (Moranus, Animadversiones, 4). On the date of De corpore‟s 
publication see Schuhmann, ed. De corpore, XLI and fn. 2. Schuhmann concludes that it was probably 
published sometime between 21 and 24 June. I have been unable to find Moranus in any of the standard bio-
bibliographical works for this region which I have consulted, including seventeenth-century sources such as 
Bibliotheca Scriptorum Societatis Jesu (Rome 1676).  
2
 Moranus describes Tacquet as “amicus meus [...] inter Belgas Geometra primae notae.” (Moranus, 
Animadversiones, 12). Tacquet‟s mathematical criticisms take up pages 13-29 of Moranus‟s book – i.e., just 
under a third of the book. 
3
 Noel Malcolm, Aspects of Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 498 
4
 Malcolm, Aspects, 289-90. 
5
 Wolfgang Breidert, „Les Mathématiques et la méthode mathématique chez Hobbes‟, Revue Internationale de 
Philosophie, 33: 129 (1979): 415-431 (425): „Hobbes avait l‟impression d‟une attaque collective parce qu‟on 
s‟élevait contre lui en division de travail: Seth Ward se bornait expressément à la partie physique, parce que la 
partie mathématique était traitée par Wallis dans l‟Elenchus et par le pere André Tacquet dans une lettre a G. 
Moranus.‟ 
6
 Seth Ward, In Thomae Hobbii philosophiam Exercitatio Epistolica (Oxford, 1656), 52. 
7
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 13: „ANDREAS TACQUET G. MORANO S. D.‟ 
8
 Alexander Bird, „Squaring the Circle: Hobbes on Philosophy and Geometry‟, Journal of the History of Ideas, 
57:2 (1996): 217-231 (218). Bird lists Moranus as being among a handful of scholars who had „given  
[Hobbes‟s mathematics] more than passing thought.‟ Strictly speaking, however, it is Tacquet and not Moranus 
who gives his attention to Hobbes‟s mathematics. 
9
 Thomas Hobbes. De Corpore. Elementorum Philosophiae Sectio prima, edited by Karl Schuhmann (Paris: 
Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1999), „Introduction‟, C, fn. 1: „Hobbes n‟a jamais revu son texte en fonction 
des critiques du De Corpore contenues dans le livre de G. Moranus (et André Tacquet), Animadversiones in 
Elementorum Philosophiae sectionem I. De Corpore. Editam A Thoma Hobbes Anglo Malmesburiensi. Londini 
1655. Bruxelles, 1655 (la préface datée du 22 Septembre 1655).‟ 
10
 Douglas Jesseph, Squaring the Circle : The War Between Hobbes and Wallis (Chicago: Chicago University 
press, 2000), 10, fn. 17. 
11
 See Jesseph, Squaring the Circle, 129: „Wallis had procured an early unbound copy of the first impression of 
De Corpore, and was able to reconstruct the unflattering history of Hobbes‟s attempt to square the circle.‟ See 
also fn. 66 which quotes G. C. Robertson on the availability of „copies carelessly issued in the first unamended 
form.‟ See also Schuhmann, „Introduction‟, XXXVII-XL. Schuhmann says that Wallis had been able to obtain 
advance proofs of Hobbes‟s work „in a more or less clandestine way‟ (de manière plus ou moins clandestine), 
XXXVIII, and suggests that a „certain negligence‟ (une certain négligence) on the part of Hobbes‟s publisher 
Crooke, might have been involved (XL). 
12
Moranus, Animadversiones,  3: „ in Theologicâ vel Ethicâ vel Physicâ & Geometricâ facultate eruditi viri‟ 
13
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 3. 
14
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 3: „auctorem novi operis Physici de Corpore & Ethici de Cive.‟ 
15
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 3: „illud quidem de Corpore ab amico, cui id negotii dederam, mihi allatum est; 
alterum vero de Cive negabat idem ipse typographum, nescio quâ causâ, ausum fuisse distrahere.‟ 
16
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 13: „I read the philosophy of that renowned gentleman Thomas Hobbes which 
you recently sent me with the greatest eagerness, and especially that part which is mathematical.‟ (Philosophiam 
V. Cl. Thomae Hobbei mihi nuper à te missum, aviditate summâ percurri, ea praesertim parte, quâ 
Mathematica est.) 
17
 Despite the fact that  Hobbes refers to Moranus as „a Jesuite‟ in his Six Lessons to the professors of the 
Mathematiques (1656), 57, I have not been able to find any evidence to support this statement. The Bibliotheca 
Scriptorum Societatis Jesu (1676) includes Tacquet, but not Moranus.  
18
 On Jesuit education in seventeenth-century „Belgium‟, see Paul Begheyn S.J., „Jesuits in the Low Countries 
and Their Publications‟, Jesuit Books in the Low Countries, 1540-1773: A Selection from the Maurits Sabbe 
Library edited by Paul Begheyn S.J., Bernard Deprez, Rob Faesen S.J., and Leo Kenis (Leuven: Peeters, 2009), 
XXI-XXV. 
19
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 3: „Lecta à me ilicò dedicatoria tua, principio quidem placuit, quia promittebat, id 
quod erat ex genio meo, ablegare à Philosophiâ voces, nescio quas, & conceptus alienos, invectos ab iis qui 
nimium sunt Metaphysici, cum jactura rei scilicet & cum injuria veritatis.‟ 
20
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 4. Cf. Hobbes, De Corpore, sig. A3r; Concerning Body, sig. Bv. 
13 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
21
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 5: „ Subiectum Philosophiae ponis corpus omne cujus generatio aliqua concipi & 
cujus comparatio secundum nullam ejus considerationem institui potest. & hinc excludis à Philosophia Deum 
inprimis tum Angelos & res omnes quae nec corpora nec corporum affectus existimantur.‟ 
22
  Ibid.: „Quaero hic abs te, primùm qua id auctoritate facis contra communem jam inde à Philosopho, qua 
semper habita est Philosophia Divinarum humanarumque rerum scientia?‟ Cf. Cicero, De officiis, I.43. 
23
 Ibid.: „Tum nullamne in Deo Generationem concipis ne illam quidem Verbi aeterni? Nullam creationem 
rerum ab eo productarum & ab illo necessario dependentium comparationem? connexionem nullam instituis 
inter illum ut motorem primum & ea quae stabilis manens dat cuncta moveri, ut hic & nunc sint?‟ 
24
 Ibid: „Denique quid in tua Philosophiae sectione 2. quam promittis de homine tractaturus es? tantumne quod 
corpus sive corporeum est? sed hoc non homo sed animal est. Etiamne quod animam, hoc est mentem, spectat, 
incorpoream illam & immortalem ex vera similitudine & aemulatione auctoris sui? sed hoc à Philosophia tua 
alienum est?‟ Moranus here is referring to Elementorum philosophiae sectio secunda: de Homine, which was 
not published until 1658, although Hobbes announces its publication at the end of the „Epistola Dedicatoria‟ of 
De Corpore (sig. A3v-[A4]r).  
25
 Moranus Animadversiones, 9. Cf. Hobbes, De Corpore, VIII.8; 66; Concerning Body, 79.   
26
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 9: „nam duo corpora se penetrantia sunt in eodem loco, & unum corpus 
reproductum vel replicatum potest esse in duobus locis.‟ 
27
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 9: „Posse autem duo corpora se penetrare & de facto penetrare se virtute entis vel 
agentis primi, hoc est Dei, ex primâ creatione corporum, quorum major densitas vel raritas aliud nihil est vel 
esse potest quàm plus vel minus materiae homogeneae intra positio.‟ 
28
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 10: „Reproductionem autem vel explicationem ejusdem corporis negare nemo 
potest nisi qui contra rationem & fidem negare velit & audeat vim agendi infinitam entis primi & resurrectionem 
carnis ejusdem verae & realis quod alibi demonstro; quorum neutrum te velle et audere confido‟. 
29
 Karl Schuhmann, „Le Vocabulaire de L‟Espace‟ in Hobbes et son Vocabulaire. Études de Lexicographie 
Philosophopique, ed. Yves-Charles Zarka (Paris: 1992), 61-82; Cees Leijenhorst, “Jesuit Conceptions of 
Spatium Imaginarium and Hobbes‟s Doctrine of Space,” Early Science and Medicine 1 (1996): 355-80; Cees 
Leijenhorst, The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism: The Late Aristotelian Setting of Thomas Hobbes‟s Natural 
Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 111-122 
30
 Martine Pécharman, „La Construction de la doctrine de l‟espace chez Hobbes: spatium/space, locus/place‟, in 
Locus-Spatium: XIV Colloquio Internazionale Roma, 3-5 gennaio, edited by Delfina Giovannozzi and Marco 
Veneziani (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 2014), 413-451 (415): „La recherche des sources jésuites du concept 
d‟espace chez Hobbes ne rend pas suffisament justice au progrès de la réflexion interne à la philosophie de 
Hobbes [...].‟ 
31
 Hobbes, De Corpore, VII.2, 57; Concerning Body, 69: „spatium est Phantasma rei existentis quatenus 
existentis.‟ 
32
 Hobbes De Corpore, VII.2, 57; Concerning Body, 69: „tantò vacuum pleno ad nova corpora recipenda 
accommodatius est.‟ 
33
Moranus, Animadversiones, 7:  „Pag. 57. n. 3. Spatii definitionem hanc assumis: spatium est Phantasma rei 
existentis quatenus existentis. Sed haec tuo ipsius argumento refellitur allato n. 2 sub finem ubi dicis, ubi aliquid 
est, nihil amplius poni potest. tantò vacuum pleno ad nova corpora recipienda accommodatius est, ergo spatium 
non est Phantasma rei existentis quatenus existentis sed potiùs est Phantasma rei non existentis quatenus non 
existentis.‟ 
34
 „Moranus, Animadversiones, 7: „ubi aliquid est phantasticè nihil aliud enim Phantasticè poni, vel ponibile dici 
potest, itaque inane Phantasma spatii non ad aliud utile est quam ad veritatem realem cum vacuis 
imaginationibus confundendam.‟ 
35
 Leijenhorst, „Jesuit Concepts‟, 368. 
36
 Leijenhorst, „Jesuit Concepts‟, 364. 
37
 See Leijenhorst, „Jesuit Concepts‟, 369-371. See also Leijenhorst‟s development of these ideas in, 
Mechanisation, 102-128. 
38
 Franciscus Toletus, Commentaria vna cum Quaestionibus in Octo Libros Aristotelis De Physica Ausculatione 
[1573] (Venice, 1600), 121r: „Verus autem locus est duplex. Alter intrinsecus rei ipsi, alter extrinsecus. 
Extrinsecus quidem est circumambiens ipsum corpus locatum, videlicet, corpus continens aut eius superficies 
vltima, de quo locutus est Aristoteles. Intrinsecus vero locus rei, est spatium illud ipsum, quod ipsa res uere intra 
se occupat, secundum suam corpulentiam.‟ See Leijenhorst „Jesuit concepts‟, 370. 
39
 Toletus, Commentaria, 115v: „Spatium illud non potest esse talis substantia ...Si talis substantia est, , vel est  
incorporea, vel corporea. Si incorporea non poterit extensa esse, & profunda cum locato: hoc enim corpori inest. 
Si corporea, quantitatem ergo habet, penetrabiturque cum corpore quolibet : at duorum corporum penetratio 
naturae non conceditur [...] non igitur est spatium illud substantia.‟ Toletus here is arguing against Proclus, who 
did regard space to be a kind of substance. 
14 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
40
 Toletus, Commentaria, 120v: „Locus alius est verus, alius imaginarius. Imaginarius quidem est, vt extra 
Coelum spatium illud imaginarium, quod ibi quisque imaginari potest. Ex vacuum etiam hic in Mundo, si esset, 
imaginarius esset locus, imaginarium videlicet spatium.‟ 
41
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 7: „Realem porrò veri loci vel spatii veritatem capit, qui dicit locum rei 
intrinsecum vel spatium unicum & reale esse ipsam rem extensam quae non alibi quam in se est: sic verus locus 
universi est ipsummet universum, quod nullibi est nisi in se, cum nihil sit extra illud: locum autem extrinsecum 
rei locatae esse superficiem corporis ambientis rem illam locatam; non autem superficiem intrinsecam extimam 
ipsius rei locatae ut videris assumere infrà c. 8, n. 5. sub finem [...].‟ Cf. ibid, 9: „I have demonstrated that many 
things have been stated incorrectly by you ... certainly these. 1. Space or place is only imagination, inside the 
mind. 2. Place is different from located magnitude. For true and real intrinsic place of a body is not different 
from the magnitude of the body. That is from the body itself; but true and real extrinisic place encloses within 
itself the located contents, it is the whole mass of the world that surrounds that body, which when the located 
body moves the better part of it remains immobile, although according to some it is changed and moved, which 
is the basis whereby a thing may be moved to another place, that is the mass of the whole universe configured 
otherwise, either in itself, or in respect to the located object, or both [...].‟ (Multa à te non rectè dici ... à me 
ostensum est: nimirum haec 1. Spatium seu locum esse tantum imaginarium, intra animum. 2. locum differre à 
magnitudine locati. verus enim & realis locus corporis intrinsecus nihil differt à magnitudine corporis, hoc est 
ipso illo corpore; verus autem & realis locus extrinsecus in se circumclausum continens locatum, est tota massa 
universi circumstans illud corpus, quae moto corpore locato potiori parte sui manet immobilis licet secundum 
aliquas mutetur & moveatur, quod fundamentum est quare res mota sit in alio loco hoc est aliter configuratâ 
massâ totius universi vel in se, vel respectu ad locatum, vel utrumque [...].‟). 
42
 Leijenhorst, „Jesuit Concepts‟, 369 and 374. 
43
 Ward, In Thomae Hobbii Philosophiam, 81: „Ait (§ 23.) Accidens illud esse quod essentiam dat homini, 
idemque esse cujus gratia nomen illi imponimus; repressit eum Moranus, silebo igitur.‟ 
44
 On Hobbes‟s use of the „accident‟ in his natural philosophy and its late-scholastic contexts see Leijenhorst, 
Mechanisation, 155-163. 
45
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 8: „ nec enim ideo quidquam est accidens, quia conceptum nobis imprimit; sed 
quia corpori accidit.‟ 
46
 Ibid. „multa in corporibus, eorum conceptum nobis imprimant quae accidentia, non sunt.‟ 
47
 Ibid, 8-9: „Quàm malè accidentia ad solos modos à te restringuntur qui à multis Philosophis non amantibus aut 
vana nomina aut conceptus, disertè negantur esse quid distinctum à rebus & circumstantiis, cum longè alia sint 
accidentia corporum realia, quae illud disponunt ad aliam & aliam formam substantialem (quidcumque demum 
illa sit quod jam statui à me nihil attinet) atque adeò quae non sunt in corporibus ut eorum conceptum nobis 
imprimant, sed ut corpora ipsa variè alterent.‟ Francisco Suárez in his Disputationes metaphysicae, saw modes 
as modifying aspects of  a thing, separate from the thing's essence, and distinct from accidents. See Francisco 
Suarez, Disputationes metaphysicae (1597), 7.1.17. 
48
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 10: „Accidens propter quod alicui certum nomen imponimus essentia dici solet ut 
rationalitas hominis; Essentia inquis tu? nam aliis ita dici non solet; cur ita amabo? quando te judice c. 3. num. 
4. eae voces essentia, entitas, omnisque illa barbaries ad Philosophiam necessaria non est, rationalitas tibi 
videtur hominis accidens? ego essentialem differentiam constitutivam hominis esse credebam [...]. Cf Hobbes, 
De corpore, 71.  
49
 Hobbes, De corpore, VIII.20, 71: „corpora quidem sint res not genitae, accidentia vero genita sed non res.‟ 
50
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 11: „ Ibidem Accidentia sunt genita sed non res. diceres, non res absoluta sive 
substantialis sed rei res vel entis ens. sed dici simpliciter non res? Philophantasus hoc probet, sed non 
Philosophus.‟ 
51
 Hobbes, De corpore, VIII.3, 64: „motus quidam, aut animi imaginantis, aut corporum ipsorum.‟ 
52
 Moranus, Animadversiones, p. 9: „qualitates vel accidentia sensibilia, sive illa dicas entis entia sive tenuia 
entia sive corpuscula sive quid aliud abstractum esse imagineris, non substant motui, sed illi subsistant sola 
accidentia sensata.‟ 
53
 See Thomas Aquinas, In XII Metaphysic., lect. 1, n. 2419.: „Nam ens dicitur quasi esse habens, hoic autem 
solum est substantia, quae subsistit. Accidentia autem dicuntur entia, non quia sunt, sed magis quia ipsis aliquid 
est; sicut albedo dicitur esse, quia ens subiectum est album. Ideo dicit, quod non dicuntur simpliciter entia, sed 
ens entia, sicut qualitas et motus.‟ 
54
 See. e.g., Gabriel Vázquez, Disputationes Metaphysicae (Madrid, 1617), p. 2v.  
55
 See, e.g. Bernardino Telesio, De rerum natura iuxta propria principia, Libri IX (Naples, 1586), II.13, 58; 
Tommaso Campanella, Prodromus philosophiae instaurandae, id est Dissertationis De Rerum Natura 
Compendium (Frankfurt, 1617), 56. 
56
  Moranus, Animadversiones, p. 9: „ut corpus cui insunt disponant atque perficiant licet à perpetua illorum ut 
sic loquar corpusculum evibratione quae fit per motum varium corporum in universo [...].‟ 
15 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
57
 On Sennert see William R. Newman, Atoms and Alchemy: Chymistry and the Experimental Origins of  the 
Scientific Revolution (Chicgao: Chicago University Press, 2006), Chs. 1-2 and Antonio Clericuzio, Elements, 
Principles and Corpuscles: A Study of Atomism and Chemistry in the Seventeenth Century (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2013), 9-34.   
58
 See Moranus, Animadversiones, p. 39: „atomus sive minimum naturale‟. On the minima naturalia tradition 
see John E. Murdoch „The Mediaeval and Renaissance Tradition of Minima Naturalia‟, Late Mediaeval and 
Early Modern Corpuscular Matter Theory, ed. by Christoph Lüthy, John E. Murdoch and William R. Newman 
(Leiden: Brill, 2001), 91-132. 
59
 Moranus, Animadversiones, p. 39: „When I say this I am not approving of Democritus who falsely and 
absurdly maintained, so it is said, that all things have been established by the fortuitous flowing together of true 
or absolutely indivisible atoms.‟  (Quod cum dico non assentior Democrito qui false & inepte censuit, uti 
quidem dicitur, ex fortuito confluxu verarum atomorum sive absolute indivisibilium omnia constitisse.) 
60
 Moranus, Animadversiones, p. 39:  „Vacuum non dari valde jejune & experimento admodum trito & veri 
ignaro probas.‟ Seth Ward briefly acknowledges these arguments of Moranus in his In Thomae Hobbii 
Philosophiam, p. 121: „What an experiment! Truly it is trite enough (whence the most learned Moranus uses this 
and other epiphets).‟ 
61
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 40: „omne mixtum etiam fluidum ... constare quam plurimis corpusculis duris & 
flexibilibus variae figurae & magnitudinis.‟ 
62
 Moranus Animadversiones, 42: „Pag. 249. num. 8.§.3. negas vim immaterialem motricem corporis propterea, 
inquis, quod nihil movet nisi corpus motum & contiguum. malè negas, & peius probas; vel enim pro ratione 
negati adfers id ipsum quod negas; quod ineptum est; vel negas à primo motore immoto & intelligentiâ se 
movente posse causari motum corporis, quae falsa esse patet ex supra dictis a me, & auctoritate Philosophi, & 
ratione.‟ 
63
  Moranus, Animadversiones, 30: „Adhaec quia quivis non omnino rudis facilè capit nullam sensionem fieri 
sine motu seu alteratione sentientis ex hoc solo satis te habere existimas ut resolute definias pag. 225. nu. 2.§ 3. 
quod sensio fit ab organi sensorii conatu (sive motu) ad extra, qui generatur à conatu ab obiecto versus interna 
eoque aliquamdiu manente. per reactionem factum Phantasma. Ego vero in hac definitione non tenebras tantum, 
sed etiam falsitatem deprehendo. Primo enim fit per te § 2 conatui seu motui ab obiecto conatus seu motus ab 
organo contrarius; ergo organi sensorii conatus ad extra non generatur à conatu ab obiecto versus interna: 
contraria enim non generantur à contrariis sed destruuntur; tum quomodo motum organi internum naturalem 
dicis, si generatur à motu seu conatu ab obiecto, qui naturali oppositus sive violentus est?‟ 
64
  Moranus, Animadversiones, 30: „Adhaec quid est illud Phantasma quod existit, in reactione aliquamdiu 
durante? an idolum aliquod chymericum inter organum & objectum invicem concurrentia prosiliens ex nihilo, 
an generatum ex alterutrius vel utriusque partibus instar foetus ex semine? Praeterea Phantasma non videtur 
tamquam aliquid situm extra organum ut dicis, loco scilicet reactionis medio inter organum & objectum motum 
contra invicem; sed videtur situm ibi ubi est objectum scilicet id, à quo Phantasma ipsum quod à sensione fit 
tamquam à fonte primo derivari judicamus.‟ 
65
 Seth Ward also criticises Hobbes for the obscurity of his conception of the phantasm, and his failure to to 
adequately define it. See Ward, In Thomae Hobbii Philosophiam, 66-7: „Primùm enim etsi jam ante sit saepiùs, 
& deinceps usurus sit per omnem hanc primam Philosophiam vocabulo phantasmatis, nondum tamen phantasma 
definivit, cujus tamen natura magis in profundo latet plerumque, quam earum quae eo nomine definiuntur […] 
quid sit phantasma Hobbius ipse & nobis jam nescire videtur [….].‟ 
66
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 30: „You might have said that sense is nothing other than a certain kind of 
motion, but not motion in general‟ (Diceres ergo sensionem nihil aliud esse praeter motum talem in specie non 
autem motum in genere). 
67
 Hobbes, De Corpore, XXV.2, 224; Concerning Body, 291. 
68
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 30: „ille motus organi & Phantasma ab illo motu existens; hoc est, ut non 
Phantasticè tecum sed physicè loquar, configuratio vel sigillatio organi ab obiecti motu & figura sibi occurrente, 
quare sensio vel sensus est? Certè si nihil aliud sensus est quam motus & configuratio organi à motu illo facta 
deberent sentire omnia corpora, quae per motum reactionis aliter atque aliter, configurantur & novum reale 
idolum seu Phantasma accipiunt, adeoque videre deberet cera contra sigillum pressa & sigillata.‟ 
69
 Hobbes, De Corpore, 224; Concerning Body, 291. 
70
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 30: „Dices. Conatus est, & non motus tantum. Sed quid est conatus ille nisi motus 
passivus ab alio item moto corpore, qui etiam in cera est. Dices conatum illum esse motum animae sive vitae 
etiam corporeae organo coexistentis sive unitae; sed illa anima sive vita quid est aliud quàm corpus, sicut etiam 
est ipsum organum imò & cera supra à me posita?‟ 
71
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 30: „Unde manet vel sensum esse etiam in cera sigillata; quod non Philosophi, ut 
inquis, viri docti sed trunci sensuere, illo enim posito & truncus est animal, & animal omne truncus est; vel non 
esse etiam illum in animâ corporeâ sive vitâ, si sensus nihil aliud est quam motus sive configuratio ipsa 
16 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
corporis.‟ Cf. ibid, 31: „you are compelled to acknowledge that this motion by which the phantasm is produced 
remains for some time in inanimate bodies too, and consequently inanimate bodies too many times collide with 
each other in a contrary motion, and thus receive phantasms, and sense phantasms, and coming back to this, 
therefore concluding and recalling what I have said above concerning the trees.‟ (fateri cogaris quod in 
corporibus etiam inanimatis motus ille a quo phantasma ortum est aliquamdiu maneat & per consequens 
inanimata quoque corpora quoties motu contrario inter se concurrunt, & ita Phantasma accipiunt, & sentire 
Phantasma, & hoc quandoque redire, ideoque & judicare & meminisse quod uti supra dixi statuere truncorum 
est.) 
72
 This refers to the claim made by Hobbes in the dedicatory epistle of De corpore, sig. A3v; Concerning Body, 
sig. [B2]r-v.    
73
Moranus, Animadversiones, 31-2: „Jam te prodere demum incipis & ostendere verum esse quod ante 
metuebam, ortus phantasmatum hoc est sensionum & sensuum id ipsum est quod animi discursus? & communis 
ille est hominibus cum brutis? hoccine illud est quod in tua dedicatoria dicebas fecisse te sect. 3. de Cive 
firmissimis rationibus Verbo divino non repugnante? Nec nimirum tibi curatio est, qui hic tam manifestè 
contradicas verbo divino, loco non uno penitus repugnanti.‟ 
74
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 31-2. 
75
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 32: „Ubi tu in verbo divino legis aliquid simile de bruto? Et cur quaeso te inter 
homines tu & bruta distinguis? aut cur ego te jam hominem vocem? si discursus animi per cujus vim homines 
sumus, praeter sensionem & sensum hoc est ortum Phantasmatum nihil est aliud, & ille brutis si aequè ac tibi 
communis est? Ego vero homines dicam eos qui veritates etiam insensibiles, cogitant, ut ego cogitare me scio; 
quibus discursus animi est non ortus Phantasmatum, sed ex principiis aeternae veritatis hoc est lumine divini 
vultus signato super nos rationalis motus; ut alibi sed hominibus tantum demonstro; paucis tibi ex tuismet 
principiis dico.‟ 
76
 Ward, In  Thomae Hobbii Philosophiam, 257: „Castigavit eum hoc nomine Cl[arissimus] Moranus (in 
Animadversionibus) indeque profluentia incommoda ostendit; nolo actum agere, nolo rem ipsam libertatis 
humane tractare; servavimus initio argumentum hoc integrum Reverendo Bramhallo.” On the Hobbes/Bramhall 
debate see Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, edited by Vere Chappell (Cambridge: Cambidge 
University Press, 1999). On Moranus‟s criticisms of Hobbes on necessity see Martine Pécharman‟s article in 
this issue. 
77
 John Wallis, Due Correction for Mr Hobbes or Schoole Discipline, for not saying his Lessons right (Oxford, 
1656), 129. 
78
 Thomas Hobbes, Six Lessons to the Professors of the Mathematiques (London: 1656), 57. Hobbes‟s attack on 
Moranus in the Six Lessons is mentioned by Simon Schaffer and Steven Shapin in Leviathan and the Air-Pump: 
Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 126.  There are no 
other references to Moranus in the book. 
79
 Hobbes, Six Lessons, 58. 
80
 Hobbes, Concerning Body, sig. [A] verso. Hobbes, De corpore, „Epistola Dedicatoria‟, sig. A2v.: „Scientiam 
Humani Corporis, Physicae partem utilissimam, in libris suis de Motu Sanguinis, & de Generatione Animalium, 
mirabili sagicitate detexit & demonstravit, Gulielmus Harvaeus.‟ 
81
 Hobbes, Concerning Body, sig. B recto. Hobbes, De corpore, „Epistola Dedicatoria‟, sig. [A2] verso: „Ante 
hos nihil certi in Physicâ erat praeter experimenta unicuique sua, & Historias Naturales, si tamen & hae 
dicendae certae sint, quae civilibus Historiis certiores non sunt.‟  
82
 Moranus, Animadversiones, 3: „ipse mihi fassus est, suam de circulari motu sanguinis doctrinam niti tantùm 
experimentis, quae tu quidem asseris nihilo ciuilibus historiiis certiora, ipse autem apud me non satis, etiam 
coram teste, & illo intelligente, defendit.‟ 
83
 Robert Boyle, An Examen Of the greatest part of Mr. Hobbs‟s Dialogus Physicus De Natura Aeris (Oxford, 
1682), 2. 
84See Siegmund Probst, „Infinity and Creation: The Origin of the Controversy between Thomas Hobbes and the 
Savilian Professors Seth Ward and John Wallis‟, British Journal for the History of Science 26 (1993): 271-279, 
and Siegmund Probst,  Die mathematische Kontroverse zwischen Thomas Hobbes und John Wallis, PhD 
Dissertation, Universityof Regensburg 1997. 
85
 There are no mentions of Moranus, for example, in Samuel I. Mintz‟s The Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-
century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1962) or in Jon Parkin‟s more recent Taming the Leviathan: The Reception of the Political and 
Religious Ideas of Thomas Hobbes in England 1640-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
